Marquette Law Review
Volume 69
Issue 2 Winter 1986

Article 2

Introduction
Lynn S. Adelman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Lynn S. Adelman, Introduction, 69 Marq. L. Rev. 159 (1986).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol69/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Volume 69

Winter 1986

No. 2

INTRODUCTION
LYNN

S. ADELMAN*

In the past ten years, few areas of law have received as
much attention by legislatures, courts and the general public
as the law governing the operation of motor vehicles while
intoxicated (OW]). Due to the efforts of interest groups such
as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and pervasive
media coverage of the issue, we have evolved from a society
which considered most drunk driving incidents to be aberrations in the lives of "social drinkers" to a society incensed at
the staggering personal and economic losses resulting from
drivers who have had "one too many." According to statistics
from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
"[fln excess of 50 percent of all drivers killed each year have
blood alcohol concentrations (BACs) higher than the legally
recognized limit, 0.10 percent." 1 An average 25,000 Americans per year lose their lives in alcohol-related traffic accidents
and more than 650,000 are injured. Conservative estimates
place the annual economic loss from these accidents at $24
billion for actual damages alone.2
State legislatures have responded to this problem by enacting a broad array of laws directed at both punishing and treating intoxicated drivers, as well as deterring others from
* B.A., Princeton University, 1961; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1965; Wisconsin
State Senator. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Donald Salm, at-

torney with the Wisconsin Legislative Council.
1. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSPORTATION, DIGEST OF STATE ALCOHOL-HIGHWAY SAFETY RELATED LEGISLATION iii (2d ed. 1983).

2. Id.
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drinking and driving.' Among the most significant of these
laws are:
1. Establishing a specific BAC as a per se OWI violation.
2. Imposing a mandatory jail sentence on OWI first
offenders.
3. Prohibiting the court from accepting plea bargains on
OWI offenses under any circumstances or restricting the
court's discretion to accept plea bargains.
4. Permitting the immediate administrative suspension
or revocation of a driver's operating privilege for refusing to
take a chemical test under an implied consent law or for having a certain BAC. The Wisconsin Legislature is currently
considering legislation to require administrative revocation
under such circumstances.
5. Increasing penalties and licensing sanctions for OWI
and for refusing to take a chemical test, especially for repeat
offenders and OWI offenders who cause death or injury. Wisconsin did this in 1981.
6. Establishing mandatory assessment of OWI violators
for alcohol-related problems and requiring treatment programs for those who are assessed to have such problems.
Again, Wisconsin incorporated this feature into its laws in
1981.

3. Wisconsin's OwI laws were extensively revised by 1981 Wis. Laws 20. The appellate courts in Wisconsin have consistently upheld the constitutionality of various
changes made by 1981 Wis. Laws 20.
In State v. Caibaiosai, 122 Wis. 2d 587, 363 N.W.2d 574 (1985), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the provision in Chapter 20 creating an affirmative defense for
a defendant tried for causing the death of another by OWI does not invade the defendant's right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution.
In State v. Muehlenberg, 118 Wis. 2d 502, 508, 347 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Ct. App.
1984), the court of appeals held that the provision in Chapter 20 creating a per se violation for driving with a BAC of 0.10% or more was not unconstitutionally void for
vagueness since persons of common intelligence could, with a fair degree of definiteness,
know when they are in danger of violating that provision.
In State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 338 N.W.2d 466 (1983), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that the provision in Chapter 20 permitting an OWI defendant to
be charged with both driving under the influence and for having a BAC of 0.10% or
more did not violate the federal or state constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy because the legislature intended prosecution for both offenses to terminate in one
conviction for both charges.
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7. Raising the legal drinking age and enacting specific
legislation relating to underage drivers who drink.
8. Imposing civil liability on sellers and, in some states,
social hosts who negligently furnish alcoholic beverages to
persons who cause injury to third persons as a result of consumption of the beverages. Recently, the Wisconsin Legislature passed, and the Governor signed, dram shop legislation
which codified two recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions. Essentially, the bill extends liability to anyone who dispenses alcohol to a person under the legal drinking age if the
dispenser knew or should have known the recipient was under
4
age.
9. Expanding prohibitions against having open containers of intoxicants in the passenger area of a motor vehicle and
imposing stronger penalties for such violations.
Wisconsin has also provided for the use of new, more reliable intoximeters with which to conduct chemical tests for
OWL. This equipment, and many of the educational, diagnostic and treatment programs designed to prevent OWI, are financed by a surcharge which persons convicted of OWI must
pay. Again, this has been a feature of Wisconsin law since
1981.
Statistics indicate that the changes in Wisconsin's OWI
laws have had positive effects. In 1980, drunk drivers caused
413 fatalities, constituting forty-two percent of the highway
fatalities; in 1981, they caused 411 fatalities or forty-four percent of traffic deaths. In 1983, the first full year during which
the revisions were in effect, drunk drivers caused 272 deaths,
representing thirty-seven percent of the total; in 1984, the
number was 282 deaths, only thirty-four percent.
Other figures show that conviction and punishment is
more certain under the revised law. For example, the conviction rate for OWI under the old law was seventy-eight percent, now it is eighty-seven percent. The number of
revocations and suspensions for OWI has increased 147%
from 1981 to 1984.
Across the nation and in Wisconsin, the revision of OWI
laws and the continuing effort to decrease OWI violations
4. See 1985 Wis. Laws 47.
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have raised numerous public policy issues, including the
following:
1. If OWI offenders, especially first offenders, are subject
to jail terms, will the courts, public defender systems, jails and
probation services be able to meet the heavy demands imposed
on them? This is of particular relevance in Wisconsin where a
first offense OWI is currently a civil forfeiture action which
may be prosecuted in municipal court. There has been at least
some legislative interest in making the first offense a criminal
offense subject to a jail term.
2. At what point are a defendant's constitutional rights
to due process violated by statutory schemes creating per se
violations or prompt administrative revocation of driving
privileges? What about sobriety checkpoints and a person's
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures?
Courts which have grappled with these issues have generally
found state schemes to be constitutionally acceptable, but the
differing provisions and procedures in the various states make
a definitive answer to these issues impossible.
3. To what degree should social hosts be held responsible
for the acts of an intoxicated guest who kills or injures a third
person? Should liability attach only where the guest is underage or visibly intoxicated at the time the alcoholic beverages
are served? Should there be a "cap" on damages recoverable
from a seller or social host? If liability is imposed, will sellers
and social hosts be able to obtain insurance to cover potential
claims? As mentioned, the Wisconsin Legislature recently acted on this issue and limited liability to those who dispense to
an underage person when they knew or should have known
they were dispensing to an under-age person. Wisconsin law
covers any dispenser, including social hosts.
4. Which of these tougher sanctions are actually effective
in reducing alcohol-related traffic .accidents? If a sanction is
only marginally effective, are the burdens the sanction places
on the offender, the offender's family and the judicial and correctional systems warranted? At least one study has concluded that harsh criminal penalties for OWI are not an
effective deterrent and that states should emphasize enforcement and prompt imposition of penalties rather than increas-
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ing the severity of penalties. 5 Other studies have shown that
license revocation or suspension is the most effective sanction
for reducing drunk driving.
In the future, legislatures may be faced with increasing
pressures to, among other things, lower the BAC level for per
se violations and to impose more substantial penalties and license sanctions on OWI offenders. Recent federal legislation
providing millions of dollars in incentive grants for states
meeting certain prescribed criteria will add to that pressure.'
Whatever the changes, the United States will still be considered lenient toward drunk drivers in comparison to other
countries. A recent article notes the following penalties for
OWI in selected countries:
1. Malaya: The driver is jailed and, if married, his or her
spouse is too.
2. Norway: For a first offense (0.05% BAC is the legal
limit), "[t]hree weeks in jail at hard labor, one year loss of
license." If a second offense occurs within five years, the violator's license is revoked for life.
3. Finland and Switzerland: "[J]ail for one year at hard

labor."
4. U.S.S.R.: "License revoked for life."
5. Bulgaria:
"A second
conviction
execution."8

results

in

Obviously, it is neither necessary, nor constitutionally permissible, to punish OWI offenders to the extent that some of
these other countries do. However, subjecting drunk drivers
to serious sanctions and requiring drivers with alcohol-based
problems to obtain necessary counseling has significant impact
on the number of OWI-related accidents on our highways.
The articles that comprise this issue of the MarquetteLaw Review explore the state of the law governing drunk driving in
Wisconsin and throughout the nation. The basic issue that
pervades each of this issue's articles is to what extent the dif5. See H. L. Ross, DETERRING DRINKING DRIVERS: LEGAL POLICY AND SOCIAL
CONTROL (1982).

6. See, e.g., Hagen, The Efficacy of Licensing Controls as a Countermeasurefor
Multiple DUI Offenders, 10 J. OF SAFETY RESEARCH 115-22 (1978).

7. For example, federal highway monies will be conditioned on the imposition of a
21 year old minimum drinking age. 23 U.S.C. § 408 (1982).

8. How They HandleDrunk DriversIn Other Countries,84 Wis. MED. J. 49 (1985).
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ferent legislatures of this country do and will restrict access to
alcohol, an important component in American social life, in
an effort to further reduce the incidence of drunk driving.

